In addition to the above blocks (and many other long-term blocks), Iran experienced multiple severe outages affecting mobile networks over the past week, which are visible in the IODA, Cloudflare Radar and Kentik datasets. As of 23rd September 2022, OONI data shows the blocking of Skype, while the blocking of Linkedin is automatically confirmed on at least 10 networks in Iran. As of 22nd September 2022, OONI data shows that multiple ISPs in Iran started blocking access to Google Play Store and Apple App Store domains. Blocking of Google Play Store and Apple App Store.As of 21st September 2022, OONI data shows that many ISPs in Iran started blocking access to WhatsApp endpoints,, and We mostly observe TCP/IP blocking, with additional DNS and TLS blocking. Previously reachable DoH endpoints (such as ) are now blocked. As of 20th September 2022, OONI data shows that ISPs in Iran started blocking domain-based DNS over HTTPS (DoH) endpoints by means of DNS based tampering (returning bogons), in addition to implementing TLS level interference. OONI data shows new blocking events in Iran amid ongoing protests: We also share IODA and Cloudflare Radar data on mobile network outages over the last few days. In this report, we share OONI network measurement findings from Iran on the blocking of WhatsApp, Instagram, Linkedin, Skype, Google Play Store, Apple App Store, and encrypted DNS (DNS over HTTPS). Over the past week, Iran experienced severe mobile network outages, in addition to increased levels of internet censorship. Amid the ongoing protests, which have reportedly resulted in at least 31 civilian deaths, Iranian authorities cracked down on the internet in an attempt to curb dissent. Protests erupted in Iran over the last week following the death of Mahsa Amini, a 22-year-old Kurdish woman who was reportedly beaten to death by Iran’s morality police for allegedly violating strict hijab rules. Simone Basso (OONI), Maria Xynou (OONI), Arturo Filastò (OONI), Amanda Meng (IODA - Georgia Tech)
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